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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
RICHARD DEE THOMAS,

;

Petitioner / Appellant,

])

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

v.

]
)
;

CaseNo.20010367-SC

STATE OF UTAH
Respondent / Appellee.

]
ARGUMENT

1.

CONTRARY TO THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE STATE'S BRIEF, MR.
THOMAS HAS ADEQUATELY BRIEFED THIS APPEAL.
The State argues that Mr. Thomas has inadequately briefed this appeal and that the

claims should therefore be dismissed. Contrary to the State's contention, Mr. Thomas has
followed the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure in adequately briefing this appeal.
The State contends that Appellant has not raised specific errors of the district court
in his opening brief. That contention is incorrect. Each of the issues posed by Mr.
Thomas in his opening brief specifically states the error of the district court. The
following are a few specific examples of errors committed by the district court addressed
by Appellant in his opening brief: (1) the district court improperly denied consideration of
issues relating to or underlying the issue of jurisdiction on the ground that the issues were
not raised in the original petition (see Appellant's Opening Brief, Argument 1); (2) the
district court improperly dismissed the instant petition on the ground that Appellant's

challenge of an arrest warrant and information charging document were not properly
raised (see Appellant's Opening Brief, Argument 2); (3) the district court erred by
declaring a lack of merit in Appellant's assertion that his bindover is invalid because it
was done by a circuit court judge rather than a magistrate and subject matter jurisdiction
is tainted by the lack of a valid bindover (see Appellant's Opening Brief, Argument 3);
(4) the district court lacked proper subject matter jurisdiction over Appellant (see
Appellant's Opening Brief, Arguments 5 and 6); and (5) the district court prematurely
dismissed the petition without holding a hearing for oral argument on the merits (see
Appellant's Opening Brief, Argument 11). Other errors relating to the above issues were
also raised in Appellant's brief and the State's assertion otherwise is incorrect.
The State also contends that Mr. Thomas has not cited to the record, a contention
that is likewise incorrect. Mr. Thomas' brief specifically made reference to and even
provided copies of the relevant portions of the record that were relied upon by Appellant
to support his arguments. Therefore, by citing to the relevant portions of the record and
providing copies of the same, Appellant has complied with the briefing rule.
The State also contends Mr. Thomas has not provided meaningful legal analysis
and simply repeats his arguments made below, but the contention is misguided. The
arguments made by Mr. Thomas provide the requisite legal analysis for the Supreme
Court to make an informed ruling on Mr. Thomas' petition, regardless of whether they
were also made below. If the State is arguing that Appellant's form of argument is
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inadequate, Appellant notes the State has itself used the same form of posing a question
directed to where the district court erred, followed by an answer to that question and
reasons for supporting the answer, as Appellant has done in the instant case. (See sample
of prior State Brief in Addendum H, at page 2 thereof). The State, in requesting dismissal
for inadequate briefing, is again attempting to reduce this entire matter to a technicality,
as it tried to do in its Motion to Summarily Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, which this
Court properly denied in its Order dated September 18, 2001.
Any lack of development of the issues would, arguably, seem to pertain to the
constitutionality of the Board's arrest warrant, and any such deficiencies, if any, are cured
by this responsive pleading. Appellant respectfully requests that his claims and
arguments contained in his opening brief and supplemented responsively herein be
considered by the Court on their merits.
2.

CONTRARY TO THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE STATE'S BRIEF, MR.
THOMAS PROPERLY APPEALED THE DECISION OF THE DISTRICT
COURT AND MR. THOMAS' ISSUES HAVE NOT BEEN RESOLVED ON
APPEAL OR WAIVED.
As stated in Appellant's Opening Brief, Mr. Thomas properly raised and preserved

the issues for appeal by filing more than six (6) years ago the instant petition, which is not
a post-conviction petition. Rather, the petition was filed as a pre-conviction petition under
former Utah R. Civ. P. rule 65B(b) and (e) (a copy of which is attached herein as
Addendum I), having no plain, speedy remedy. Because Mr. Thomas filed the petition
pro se, the Court should liberally interpret the nature of Mr. Thomas' petition, consistent
-3-

with the liberal pleading practices and procedures of the Rules of Civil Procedure. See
Robert E. Wilcox, Liquidator of Southern American Insurance Co. v. Geneva Rock
Corporation, 911 P.2d 367 (Utah 1996). This Court has "reiterated that 'the fundamental
purpose of our liberalized pleading rules is to afford parties the privilege of presenting
whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their dispute.'9' Id. (Quoting
Williams v. State Farm Insurance Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982)). In addition to the
liberal interpretation to which pro se papers are entitled, Appellant notes further that
unadjudicated issues of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived.1 The district court
therefore committed plain error by holding, in part, that the issues relating to subject
matter jurisdiction may have been waived (see pages 2-3 in Memorandum Decision of
February 22,2001 in addendum A of Appellant's Opening Brief). Further, Mr. Thomas'
issues have not been seriously addressed until now, though the district court itself
purported to permit these issues, by its Order of August 31, 2000 (see Addendum F in
Appellant's Opening Brief). Still further, the untreated issues that have yet to be
meaningfully adjudicated have not been deliberately waived by Mr. Thomas, and must
therefore now be adjudicated. Andrews v. Morris, 607 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1980).
Liberally interpreting Mr. Thomas' pro se petition, there is enough factual evidence of
record and in Mr. Thomas' addenda to support the instant appeal, and the issues raised in
1

See Barnard v. Wasserman, 855 P.2d 243, 248 (Utah 1993); and James v. Galetka, 965
P.2d 567; 351 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (Utah App. 1998). The State appears to acknowledge that Mr.
Thomas' issues may not have been previously adjudicated (see Brief of Appellee page 13) and
the State fails to establish that they were adjudicated.
-4-

said petition. Notwithstanding the above, if the Court deems the issues raised on appeal
not to have been properly raised below, Appellant respectfully requests the Court either
deem them raised by Appellant's Opening Brief in combination with the original pro se
petition, or remand for leave to file an amended petition.
Even if it is found that Appellant's Opening Brief raises new issues that were not
preserved below at the trial court level, there are exceptions to the rule that a defendant
who fails to bring an issue before the trial court is generally barred from raising it for the
first time on appeal, which rule Appellant acknowledges is supported in State v. Lopez,
886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994); and State v. Archambeau. 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah
App. 1991). Three independent exceptions to this general rule are recognized in Utah.
(1) An appellate court may address an issue for the first time on appeal if appellant
establishes that the trial court committed "plain error," State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,
1208-09 (Utah 1993); Archambeau. 820 P.2d at 922; (2) if there are "exceptional
circumstances," Id.; or (3) in some situations, if a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel is raised on appeal even though, by reason of the claimed ineffectiveness, the
matter was not raised during trial. See State v. Humphries. 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah
1991); State of Utah v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1996).
Assuming, arguendo, that Mr. Thomas should have raised his 65B(b) issues at the
trial court level or on appeal of his conviction, Mr. Thomas should not be held
responsible for his indigent status which required him to use counsel that was clearly
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ineffective in that case. Indeed, many of the issues of merit will never be heard unless
this Court agrees to address such unadjudicated issues and allow Mr. Thomas the chance
to have these issues finally heard, in contrast to the procedure that our system has
perpetrated on Mr. Thomas. Therefore, even if it is found that an issue has been brought
up on appeal for the first time, the ineffective assistance of Mr. Thomas' counsel at trial
(explained below) should not bar him from having his claims heard, a due process
imperative permitted by the third exception referred to above.
The ineffective assistance of counsel exception applies in this case because the
trial judge specifically declined to address the pre-conviction issues raised by this
petition, and specifically instructed Appellant and his then counsel that Appellant may
raise such issues on appeal. (See Addendum J, attached herein). Given such explicit
instructions, coupled with the State's assertions that the issues raised here were not raised
at trial or on appeal, the Court is requested to take judicial notice of the fact that Mr.
Thomas' prior counsel's assistance is necessarily ineffective by counsel's failure to raise
the unadjudicated issues brought up in this petition, and which the trial judge specifically
instructed should be raised on appeal.
Mr. Thomas even tried to consolidate the unadjudicated issues on direct appeal of
his conviction with the Supreme Court, however, this Court declined to consolidate those
issues and remanded the writ back to the district court for disposition. (See Addendum K,
attached herein). Because the district court did not properly adjudicate all of the issues
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raised by this petition, and because those issues were not raised on appeal by Mr.
Thomas' counsel, and because Mr. Thomas' later pro se effort to consolidate them with
his appeal did not succeed, disposition of all said issues by this Court is sought.
The State has attempted to characterize the instant petition as a post-conviction
habeas corpus petition because the petition was heard after Mr. Thomas was convicted.
Additionally, the district court treated the petition only as one for habeas corpus under the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure rule 65B(b) Wrongful Imprisonment, as it existed prior to
the 1996 amendments,2 and not as a rule 65B(e) petition for Wrongful Use of Judicial
Authority or Failure to Comply With Duty, as it was filed in part. Now, the State would
like the Supreme Court to view the instant petition as either being barred by rule 65B(a)
arguing Mr. Thomas had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy available through the
appeals process, or as moot.
However, the State's characterization is incorrect. Mr. Thomas actually filed the
petition and the subsequent amended petition under two subsections of rule 65B, namely
65B(b) and 65B(e) (R. 00001-00006 and 00121-00127). Additionally, Mr. Thomas filed
the instant petition February 7, 1995 and amended said petition on March 27,1995, more
than five (5) months prior to his trial in August of 1995, where he was convicted, making
this petition a pre-conviction petition and not a post-conviction petition as characterized

2

All references to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 65B will be to the rules as they
existed at the time of Mr. Thomas' filing of his petition in 1995, and thus the 1996 amendments,
which incorporated 65B(b) into 65C, are inapplicable.
-7-

by the State. The issues presented in this timely filed and until now ignored preconviction petition should be addressed because the bases for appellant's conviction are
much different than the issues raised in appellant's rule 65B petition for pre-conviction
extraordinary relief Accordingly, it is important that the Court avoid treating this matter
as merely a petition for post-conviction relief confined to the issues raised at trial, as the
principles of due process dictate that Mr. Thomas not be denied the chance to have the
present issues heard. The fact that Mr. Thomas, after filing his petition, was tried and
convicted in an entirely separate proceeding on the evidence proffered, does not
extinguish his right to challenge the subject matter jurisdiction, wrongful imprisonment,
and wrongful use of judicial authority, as the issues Appellant properly raised before trial
by the petition have until now been substantially ignored.
Even though the district court viewed the petition as though it had been filed under
rule 65B(b) for post-conviction relief in the nature of a writ for habeas corpus, the
Supreme Court is not bound by the district court's characterization of the petition. Renn
v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons. 904 P.2d 677, 681 (Utah 1995). The Supreme Court should
look to the substance of the action and nature of the instant, pro se, petition to ascertain
the relief sought in determining the true nature of the extraordinary relief requested by
Mr. Thomas. Id. Thus, as the Court stated in Renn. "the name a party or a court applies
to an action for an extraordinary writ is not binding if the true nature of the petition is
other than the name applied to it." Id. Therefore, the Court should view this petition as
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one not only for wrongful imprisonment, but also as one for wrongful use of judicial
authority or failure to comply with duty under rule 65B(e) and as a challenge to subject
matter jurisdiction.
Similar to Renn, Mr. Thomas also challenges the Board's decisions and authority
to issue an arrest warrant3 from which the State ultimately claims to have lawfully held
Mr. Thomas for the offense for which he was convicted. Mr. Thomas' rule 65B(e)
petition is the proper petition for challenging the Board's decisions and authority,
according to Padilla v. Utah Bd. of Pardons and Parole and State of Utah, 947 P.2d 664,
667 (Utah 1997). Therefore, because the State claims to derive its detainment and arrest
of Mr. Thomas as being based on the arrest warrant of the Board, due process requires
Mr. Thomas be permitted to challenge the Board's decisions and authority to arrest him as
well as the State's subsequent claim to have lawfully detained Mr. Thomas. The Board's
actions, coupled with the other state constitutional and statutory violations committed by
the State, as argued in Appellant's Opening Brief and in Mr. Thomas' pro se petition,
should therefore be reviewed on the merits, and Mr. Thomas should be released.
3.

CONTRARY TO THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE STATE'S BRIEF, THE
DISTRICT COURT DID NOT PROPERLY DISMISS THE PETITION FOR
EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF IN RELIANCE ON THE ACTIONS OF THE
BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE.
A.

3

This Petition is the Only Procedural Mechanism Available for Challenging
the Board.

See Addendum G in Petitioner / Appellant's Opening Brief.
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The decision of the Board concerning paroles, pardons, commutations or
terminations of sentence, restitution, or remission of fines or forfeitures are deemed by
the statute to be "final and are not subject to judicial review," pursuant to UCA 77-275(3). The State itself asserts that the Board's actions cannot be reviewed by the trial
court. (See Brief of Appellee pages 28-29). Therefore, because the legislature has
provided no mechanism for direct appeal from the Board of Pardons' actions, an
extraordinary petition under rule 65B(e) is an appropriate remedy to challenge the
Board's decisions and authority, Padilla v. Utah Bd. of Pardons and Parole and State of
Utah, 947 P.2d 664, 667 (Utah 1997), and it is therefore not possible for Mr. Thomas to
have waived his right to challenge the Board's action. Mr. Thomas' rule 65B(e) petition
is proper in this case because the arrest warrant issued by the Board dealt with conditions
or violations of Mr. Thomas' parole, which issues are not subject to judicial review.
Preece v. House. 886 P.2d 508, 512; 252 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (Utah 1994). Therefore,
those issues that are interconnected with the arrest warrant issued by the Board, may not
be properly resolved without reference to the Board's arrest warrant because the decision
of the Board is what the State ultimately relies upon for its authority to hold and detain
Mr. Thomas. All of the violations by the State after that detainment are, therefore,
interconnected with said Board's invalid arrest warrant and are thereby tainted from it,
and since there is no judicial review of the Board's actions there can be no complete
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review of the circumstances present in this case except by way of this extraordinary
petition.
The right to challenge the Board of Pardons is provided under the very rule this
petition was filed under, rule 65B(e), according to this Court. Padilla v. Utah Board of
Pardons and Parole, 947 P.2d 664, 667 (Utah 1997). In contrast, the rule 65B(b) writ of
habeas corpus is available only to petitioners challenging the legality of his or her
detention, the lawfulness of the court imposed sentence, or the conditions of his or her
imprisonment. Id. In Padilla, the plaintiff challenged the Board's actions under rule
65B(b), (c) and (e), alleging that the Board denied him of his due process rights. Because
the challenges did not involve the legality of his detention, the conditions of his
imprisonment or a court-imposed sentence, the writ of habeas corpus under 65B(b) was
not available. Instead, the plaintiffs claims in Padilla challenging the Board's actions
were reviewable only under rule 65B(e).
In the instant case, Mr. Thomas filed a 65B petition under subsections (b) and (e)
claiming a lack of jurisdiction by the Board and the court commissioner. In order to come
under the scope of 65B(b) a habeas corpus petition must challenge a conviction or
sentence for a criminal offense, and matters challenging anything other than a conviction
or sentence for a criminal offense and actions taken by the Board of Pardons and Parole
will not come under the scope of 65B(b). In the present case, Mr. Thomas challenges the
jurisdiction of the court commissioner and the Board of Pardons and Parole in issuing
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their respective arrest warrants as well as other matters included in his petition.
Therefore, Mr. Thomas correctly used, as one of his bases for relief, rule 65B(e) for
challenging the Board of Pardons and Parole as supported by Padilla.
As argued in Appellant's Opening Brief, the arrest warrant4 issued by the court
commissioner six (6) days after Mr. Thomas' arrest was invalid because the court
commissioner lacked the requisite judicial authority. State v. Thomas. 961 P.2d 299, 303
(Utah 1998). Likewise, the charging information, executed by the same court
commissioner who executed the invalid search warrant and invalid arrest warrant, is also
invalid because said court commissioner had no judicial authority to execute such a
document. The charging information also lacked basis by its reliance on an
uncorroborated confession by Mr. Thomas.5 Further, the State has failed to disprove the
fact that the court commissioner only has misdemeanor jurisdiction, and since the county
prosecutor failed to enter a new, corrected charging document curing the error of the
prosecution's failure to have the charging document entered by a magistrate judge as
required by law, jurisdiction is wholly lacking. Therefore, the prosecution should have
issued a corrected arrest warrant but they failed to do so.
The State argues the above facts are moot because they already had the outstanding
arrest warrant issued by the Board for Mr. Thomas, and that warrant entitled the State to
4

See Addendum G in Petitioner / Appellant's Opening Brief.

5

See pages 1-2 of the Information in Addendum G of Petitioner / Appellant's Opening

Brief.
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charge Mr. Thomas with the underlying robbery even though Mr. Thomas' arrest and
detention were originally deemed warrantless, as indicated by the prosecution's efforts to
obtain the invalid court commissioner arrest warrant and an invalid charging document
six (6) days later. However, there should be no separation of the events that led to the
arrest of Mr. Thomas and the totality of the circumstances should be viewed in
conjunction with, and not separatefrom,the invalid arrest warrant issued by the Board.
In so doing, it may be concluded that the court commissioner lacked the judicial authority
to issue an arrest warrant and a proper charging document, and that the Board similarly
lacked the requisite judicial authority to issue an arrest warrant, and that the State
therefore held Mr. Thomas unlawfully and failed to hold a probable cause hearing for the
robbery within forty-eight (48) hours of the arrest as required by law.
B.

The Board Lacks the Appropriate Judicial Authority to Issue an Arrest
Warrant.

Mr. Thomas challenges UCA 77-27-11(3) as a violation of the separation of
powers doctrine, as the Board of Pardons and Parole lacks the appropriate judicial
authority to issue an arrest warrant. The Utah Supreme Court employs an analytical
model when the constitutionality of a statute is attacked on the basis of the separation of
powers doctrine. Article V, section 1, of the Utah State Constitution contains the
separation of powers provision, which reads:
[i] The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into
three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial;
and [ii] no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging
-13-

to one of these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to
either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or
permitted.
The analytical model has a three part analysis: (1) are those in question "charged
with the exercise of powers properly belonging to" one of the three branches of
government? (2) Is the function that the statute has given those in question one
"appertaining to" another branch of government? (3) Last, if the answer to both of the
above two questions is "yes" then does the constitution "expressly direct or permit"
exercise of the otherwise forbidden function? If not, then article V section 1 is
transgressed. In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, the Honorable David S. Young, District
Judge. 976 P.2d 581, 584; 361 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah 1999).
The Board of Pardons and Parole is not a judicial branch nor is it made up of
judges, but is merely an administrative agency and a part of the executive branch of
government, according to article VII, section 12 of the Utah State Constitution. Article
VII relates to the executive branch of the government and section 12 reads in part:
(1) There is created a Board of Pardons and Parole. The Governor shall
appoint the members of the board with the consent of the Senate. The terms
of office shall be as provided by statute.
(2) The Board of Pardons and Parole, by majority vote and upon other
conditions as provided by statute, may grant parole, remit fines, forfeitures,
and restitution orders, commute punishments, and grant pardons after
convictions, in all cases except treason and impeachments, subject to
regulations as provided by statute.
Therefore, the Board has been created by the Utah State Constitution as a part of the
executive branch and its authority to act is enumerated in subsection (2) above and does
-14-

not include core judicial functions. Even the State's brief admits that the Board is not a
part of the judicial branch (See Brief of Appellee page 24), and other state departments
recognize the same. (See Addendum L, attached herein).
Proceeding with the separation of powers analysis laid out by the Supreme Court,
the first inquiry is whether the Board is "charged with the exercise of powers properly
belonging to" one of the three branches of government. The answer to this question is
"yes." According to the Utah State Constitution, the Board has been given executive
authority to grant parole, remit fines, forfeitures, and restitution orders, commute
punishments, and grant pardons after convictions, all of which are executive powers.
Therefore, the Board is charged with powers properly belonging to the executive branch.
Secondly, and most importantly, is the function that the statute has given the
Board one "appertaining to" another branch of government? The answer to this question
is "yes." The statute in question, UCA 77-27-11(3), reads in part:
Any member of the board may issue a warrant based upon a certified
warrant request to a peace officer or other persons authorized to arrest,
detain, and return to actual custody a parolee, and may upon arrest or
otherwise direct the Department of Corrections to determine if there is
probable cause to believe that the parolee has violated the conditions of his
parole.
In determining whether the power enumerated in the statute belongs to another branch of
government, other than the executive branch, the case of State v. Thomas. 961 P.2d 299,
303 (Utah 1998), is insightful. The Supreme Court in that case relied on its decision in
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Ohms6 and determined that core judicial functions include: (1) the power to hear and
determine controversies between adverse parties and questions in litigation, (2) the
authority to hear and determine justiciable controversies, (3) the authority to enforce
any valid judgment, decree or order, and (4) all powers that are necessary to protect the
fundamental integrity of the judicial branch (emphasis added). In Thomas, the Supreme
Court definitively concluded that a search warrant is an order and that issuance of such a
warrant is a core judicial function. Using like reasoning as the Supreme Court in
Thomas, an arrest warrant is also a core judicial function because it is also an order, an
order to seize a person and deprive that person of his/her liberty. Although there is no
definition of an arrest warrant in the Utah Code as there is for a search warrant, an arrest
warrant is a deprivation of a person's liberty. The word "warrant" itself, as defined in a
standard dictionary, is "An order that serves as authorization, especially: (a) A voucher
authorizing payment or receipt of money; or (b) Law, A judicial writ authorizing an
officer to make a search, seizure, or arrest or to execute a judgment." When a judge
issues to law enforcement an order to seize an individual, the judge simultaneously
exercises the power and authority to enforce such an order, because once armed with an
issued warrant, law enforcement proceeds to deprive a person of his/her liberty. Thus,
because an arrest warrant is an order, similar to a search warrant, and the issuer claims the
authority to enforce the order, the issuance of an arrest warrant should be considered a

6

Salt Lake Citv v. Ohms. 881 P.2d 844 (Utah 1994).
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core judicial function. See State v. Thomas. Therefore, when the Board issues a warrant
pursuant to UCA 11-21A 1(3), it exercises judicial authority, which power appertains to
another branch of government beside the executive branch, of which the Board is a part.
Third, and lastly, since the answer to both of the above two questions is "yes," we
must ask: does the constitution "expressly direct or permit exercise of the otherwise
forbidden function?" The answer to this question is "no," and article V section 1 of the
Utah Constitution is transgressed. The Utah Constitution does not expressly direct or
permit exercise of the warrant function that the statute authorizes, and therefore, article V,
section 1 is transgressed and UCA 77-27-11(3) should be struck down as
unconstitutional, and the same is respectfully requested.
C.

The Board Lacks the Ultimate Judicial Power to Revoke Its Own
Agreement.

Unadjudicated issues of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be
brought up at any stage of a proceeding.7 Mr. Thomas challenges the Board's power to
revoke his parole as a violation of the separation of powers doctrine because the authority
delegated to the Board involves a core judicial function which an administrative agency
cannot perform. Therefore, the Board lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear Mr.
Thomas' parole revocation case. The "judicial power of courts" is understood to mean
the power to hear and determine controversies between adverse parties and questions in
litigation. Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d at 849. In the instant case, the Board, as an
7

See Barnard v. Wasserman. 855 P.2d 243,248 (Utah 1993).
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administrative agency, does not have the judicial power of courts to hear and determine
the outcome of a parole revocation proceeding because such a hearing on the merits is a
core judicial function.
As stated above, this Court has determined that core judicial functions include: (1)
the power to hear and determine controversies between adverse parties and
questions in litigation, (2) the authority to hear and determine justiciable controversies,
(3) the authority to enforce any valid judgment, decree or order, and (4) all powers that
are necessary to protect the fundamental integrity of the judicial branch (emphasis
added).8 In this case, Mr. Thomas and the Board are adverse parties because the parole
agreement, between Mr. Thomas and the Board, is an enforceable contract. The Board
does not have the judicial authority to adjudicate, let alone the authority to adjudicate its
own contract and then enforce it by issuing an invalid arrest warrant depriving Appellant
of his due process rights by unlawfully detaining him. If otherwise allowed, the Board's
power would be akin to having two parties to a contract, one of which unilaterally
determines that a breach has occurred and then enforces their will on the other party, not
by enforcing the contract in court on the merits (as is appropriate), but by unilaterally
dictating its own remedy. That is exactly what the Board has done in this case.
According to the Board's rule, R671-507(1), which was in effect during the
relevant time period, and the parole agreement (see Addendum M, attached herein), the

8

See State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 303 (Utah 1998).
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Board may take action against a parolee only upon a violation of the parole agreement or
upon a conviction for a new crime. In either case, Mr. Thomas had the right to have his
parole revocation case heard by a judge, pursuant to this Court's rulings cited above, and
because the Board does not have the judicial authority to enforce or hear the controversy
to which it is a party, as that is a core judicial function only a magistrate judge can
perform. Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d at 852. Therefore, an individual, other than a
duly appointed judge, who wields such judicial power as the Board's action in this case is
a violation of the separation of powers. Id Dismissal of this issue was improper.
4.

CONTRARY TO THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE STATE'S BRIEF, THE
DISTRICT COURT DID NOT PROPERLY DISMISS THE PETITION FOR
EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF WITHOUT ORAL ARGUMENT ON THE
MERITS BECAUSE, AS ARGUED IN APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF, THE
DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER VESTED PROCEDURAL RIGHTS IN
APPELLANT.
The district court below on August 31, 2000, entered an Order to vacate a minute

entry pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). (See Addendum F in Appellant's Opening Brief).
The district court directed the State to respond to both the petition and amended petition
filed by Mr. Thomas, pro se. According to item 6 of the Order, the issues of the petition
include:
those raised in the original petition of February 7, 1995, and the amended
petition of March 27, 1995. This [sic] issues shall be confined generally to
the issue of jurisdiction, the validity of the search warrant, arrest warrant
and the Information charging document, the issue of whether a proper
probable cause determination was made, the issue concerning the board
warrant, and any other issue raised in said original petition of February 7,
1995, or said amended petition of March 27, 1995.
-19-

Therefore, in its decision to vacate the minute entry, the district court acknowledged the
issues presented by the instant petition. Thus, the fact that the district court ordered the
petition to move forward on those issues is a recognition that the petition did in fact
present those issues and possibly other issues not enumerated therein.
Besides recognizing the issues presented by the pro se petition, the August 31,
2000 Order vacating the minute entry also recognized the need for an oral hearing on the
merits and in fact promised the same, but failed to allow one. The record below,
particularly Appellant's Motion and Memorandum in Support of Motion Under Utah R.
Civ. P. 60(b) to Vacate Minute Entry and Set Date for Evidentiary Hearing, or Notice of
Time for Filing Notice of Appeal (R. 01813-01850), indicates the need for a hearing on
the merits. Subsequent to the filing and granting of said motion and memorandum, the
district court itself ordered, in item 5, the following: "At the appropriate time, the court
shall schedule a hearing for oral argument." The district court thereby vested certain
procedural rights in Mr. Thomas that it later violated, because no hearing on the merits
was ever scheduled despite the need and Order guaranteeing one.
Alternatively, even if there are no factual issues in dispute, the district court made
several inconsistent statements that led to issues being metaphorically swept under the
rug. As stated above, according to the Order of August 31, 2000, the district court
recognized the issues as being presented by the petition (see item 6 of that Order,
Addendum F in Appellant's Opening Brief), and ordered both parties to respond
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appropriately. However, in its Memorandum Decision the district court contradicted its
earlier Order stating that: "First, the Court notes that these issues (regarding the court
commissioner's arrest warrant and charging information) were not properly raised in
petitioner's Petition" (see Memorandum Decision pages 2-3, Addendum A in Appellant's
Opening Brief) and then gave little more than lip service to the issue presented, stating
there was a valid Board warrant already issued. This is an example of how the State has
attempted to isolate the timing of the events, as argued above, and dispose of each issue
one by one in isolation by referring to some other document or aspect of the case that is
invalid, without considering the timing of the invalid documents together in a totality of
the circumstances analysis. For example, the issuance of the Board's arrest warrant was
dealt with by the district court in two different parts of its Memorandum Decision of
February 22, 2001, and both parts were isolated from the other. The first part cited the
pre-existing Board arrest warrant as one reason why the validity of the court
commissioner's warrant is supposedly moot. The second part of the lower decision that
addressed the Board-issued warrant is simply lip service, stating only: "The Court is of
the opinion that the argument that the Board warrant was invalid is without merit."9 A
hearing on the merits, as ordered, would have allowed the review this Court is now asked
to make, concerning the relationship between the lack of judicial authority vested in the

9

See page 4 of the Memorandum Decision dated February 22, 2001, of Addendum A in
Petitioner / Appellant's Opening Brief.
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court commissioner as well as in the Board, and the invalid arrest warrants and other
invalid documents.
Assuming the Order of August 31, 2000 was not mere form over substance, said
Order vested certain rights in Appellant, including the right to raise the issues specified in
the Order as well as any others deemed to have been raised in Mr. Thomas' original rule
65B petitions. After succeeding in having the petition reinstated by his motion below
under rule 60(b), Mr. Thomas raised the issue of the adequacy of his petitions in his
supporting pleading below10, and he had planned to raise these issues during the promised
hearing that was never held. Accordingly, Mr. Thomas' issues have either been properly
raised in his petitions, as recognized by the district court in its Order of August 31, 2000,
or otherwise Mr. Thomas would have had a chance at the hearing to request leave for
amending his timely-filed rule 65B petition, or Mr. Thomas should, alternatively, now
have a chance to amend the petition since unadjudicated issues of subject matter
jurisdiction cannot be waived under the above authority.
5.

CONTRARY TO THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE STATE'S BRIEF, MR.
THOMAS WAS NOT IN THE LAWFUL CUSTODY OF THE STATE, THE
TRIAL COURT LACKED JURISDICTION, AND THE LACK OF A
PROBABLE CAUSE HEARING WITHIN 48 HOURS OF ARREST SUPPORTS
THE CONCLUSION THAT MR. THOMAS MUST NOW BE RELEASED.
The State turns to the state of Wisconsin by citing the case of State v. Harris, 174

Wis.2d 367, 375; 497 N.W.2d 742 (Wis. App. 1993), for the proposition that Mr. Thomas
l0

See (from lower court proceeding) Memorandum in Reply to Respondent's Response to
Petition and Motion to Dismiss, and Request for Hearing Ordered by Court (R. 02038-02110).
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was already in the state's lawful custody because he is a parolee, and that the requirement
for a probable cause determination by a judicial officer within 48 hours is therefore
inapplicable. The State fails to mention that the Harris case pertained not to a parolee but
to an individual who was already incarcerated and had been captured and arrested while
attempting to escape, a key fact absent in this case and which underlies the Harris court's
determination that the 48-hour rule did not apply. Mr. Thomas was a parolee, not an
escapee. As established by the U.S. Supreme Court, a parolee is not "in custody" merely
because he is on parole,11 and the State's assertion to the contrary is therefore incorrect.
Since Mr. Thomas was not arrested for an escape attempt, this case thereby lacks the type
of facts upon which the entire Harris decision was based, and Harris clearly cannot be
applied to waive Mr. Thomas' constitutional right to a probable cause determination by a
judicial officer within 48 hours. A finding otherwise would fly in the face of the U.S.
Supreme Court's Morrissey decision.
The law clearly states that an individual cannot be detained, without a probable
cause determination by a judicial officer, for longer than 48 hours after an arrest without a
valid warrant, and the rule cited by the U.S. Supreme Court, and Utah's own rules,

1

^orrissev et al. v. Brewer et aL 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).
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indicate that releasing Mr. Thomas is a proper remedy under these circumstances.12 It is
further noted that:
Where an arrested individual does not receive a probable cause
determination within 48 hours, the calculus changes. In such a case, the
arrested individual does not bear the burden of proving an unreasonable
delay. Rather, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate the
existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance.
The fact that in a particular case it may take longer than 48 hours to
consolidate pretrial proceedings does not qualify as an extraordinary
circumstance.
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin. 500 U.S. 44, 57 (1991).
The State has failed to establish that Mr. Thomas' arrest included a valid warrant,
or that the lack of a probable cause determination by a judicial officer within 48 hours
was occasioned by a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance. Since no
such determination was made in the two (2) years between Mr. Thomas' arrest and his
trial, Appellant respectfully submits that the State cannot prove the existence of an
emergency or extraordinary circumstance that could have postponed the required probable
cause determination for so long.
This Court has previously declared, in State v. Thomas, that the search warrant in
this case was invalid because a court commissioner does not have the judicial authority to
exercise such core judicial functions, such as issuance of a search warrant. If this Court

12

Utah R. J. Admin. § 4-611(1) (Petitioner, if arrested without a valid arrest warrant,
cannot be held for longer than 48 hours if a probable cause determination by a judicial authority
is not made within 48 hours of the arrest); Powell v. Nevada, 511 U.S. 79, 81-83 (1994) (an
arrested person be released if not brought before a magistrate within 72 hours).
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additionally finds that the arrest warrant and the charging information document, both of
which were signed by the same court commissioner who signed the invalid search
warrant, were invalid for the same reasons, and if this Court further finds that the Board
lacks the requisite judicial authority to issue an arrest warrant, then the trial court lacked
jurisdiction and the State unlawfully held Mr. Thomas. Therefore, because the State held
Mr. Thomas unlawfully and the State did not hold a probable cause hearing within 48
hours of Mr. Thomas' arrest, the opportunity for the State to cure the above mentioned
defects is barred by the statute of limitations, and Mr. Thomas should be released, or
alternatively, Appellant should at the very least be retried.
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Appellant respectfully submits that the facts, points and arguments made herein are
sufficient to state a claim for which relief can be granted, that the issues have been
properly preserved and that the petition should be granted. Based upon the foregoing,
Appellant respectfully requests this Court to reverse the ruling of the lower court, declare
UCA § 77-27-11(3) unconstitutional, and either order Appellant's release from
incarceration, or remand for further proceedings consistent with the arguments herein, or
provide other relief as this Court deems just. In the alternative, Appellant respectfully
requests remand for leave to file an amended petition.
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Respectfully submitted, and dated this

11 day of December, 2001.

fearl R. Cannon TUSB
#6508^
t'Karl
(USB #6508)
Attorney for Appellant
CLAYTON, HOWARTH & CANNON, P.C.
1225 East Fort Union Boulevard, Suite 300
Midvale, Utah 84047
P.O. Box 1909
Sandy, Utah 84091-1909
Telephone: (801) 255-5335
Facsimile: (801) 255-5338
Attorney for Appellant
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Addendum H

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Petitioner,

:

v.

:

ANNA MARIE MORGAN,

:

Defendant/Respondent.

Case No. 20000257-SC

Priority No. 13

:

BRIEF OF PETITIONER
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The State appeals the court of appeals' decision in State v. Morgan, 2000 UT App.
48, 997 P.2d 910, cert granted, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000),. which reversed defendant's
convictions for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, a second degree
felony, in violation of UTAH

CODE ANN.

§ 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) (1998), and possession of

marijuana, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)

(1998). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to its grant of certiorari review.
ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(a) & (5) (1996).

UTAH CODE

STATEMENT OF ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE BELOW
Certiorari was granted to review Morgan's interpretation and application of State v.
Brickey, 714 P.2d 644, 647 (Utah 1986), which held that due process guarantees limit the
State's ability to refile an information previously dismissed for insufficient evidence unless
the prosecutor "show[s] that new or previously unavailable evidence has surfaced or that
other good cause justifies refiling." See Addenda A (Morgan) & B (Brickey).
Specifically, was the court of appeals correct in effectively abolishing the "other good
cause" prong ofthe Brickey test by imposing a rigid and unprecedented new requirement that
"new or previously unavailable evidence" must always be presented in order to allow refiling
of a criminal charge that has been previously dismissed at the preliminary hearing stage?
Standard of Review: On certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the court of
appeals for correctness by applying the same standard of review applicable to that court.
State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, ^[10, 994 P.2d 1243.
Whether due process precludes refiling in a particular case is a question of law,
reviewed on appeal for correctness. Morgan, 2000 UT App. 48 at ^8. See also State v.
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). The trial court's underlying factualfindingsare
accorded deference and rejected only for clear error. Morgan at ^|8.
Preservation Below: The State has consistently argued that refiling of the information
was permissible in this case (Rl: 16-18; R2:23-25; PHI: 36-38; JuneHg: 2-9; Sept Hg: 15-

2

njOctHg^^o). 1
STATUTES. RULES. AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Determinative provisions, attached in Addendum C, include:
U.S. CONST, amend. XIV, sec. § 1;
UTAH CONST, art. I, § 7;
UTAH R. CRIM. P. 7

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On January 22,1998, defendant was charged with second degree felony possession
ofmethamphetamine with intent to distribute and misdemeanor possession ofmarijuana (Rl:
1-3).
A preliminary hearing was held on May 6,1998, before Magistrate Michael K. Burton
(PH1). The magistrate initially ruled that the preliminary hearing evidence was sufficient to
establish defendant's unlawful possession of both drugs, but was insufficient to establish
defendant's intent to distribute the methamphetamine (PHI: 34-38). The prosecutor
immediately moved to reopen the preliminary hearing to permit another officer to testify
(PHI: 3, 38). The magistrate took the matter under advisement but eventually denied the

1

The record on appeal combines two district court records: Case No.
981200247FS contains the original information and first preliminary hearing; Case No.
981201030FS includes the refiled information, second preliminary hearing, and trial. In
this brief, the pleading file in the first case is designated as Rl, the transcript of the first
preliminary hearing as PHI, the second pleading file as R2, and the second preliminary
hearing as PH2. Transcripts of motion hearings are referred to by month, all having
occurred in 1998: June Hg, Sept. Hg & Oct. Hg. The trial transcript is designated by
name.
3

Addendum I

PREFACE
This volume replaces the 1994 edition of the Utah Court Rules Annotated
and its October 1994 Supplement. It contains state court rules, local federal
court rules, and the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.
This volume contains new and amended rules received as of January 31,
1995, and notes to the following sources:
Pacific Reporter, 2d Series, through 884 P.2d 644.
Supreme Court Reporter, through 115 S. Ct. 536.
Federal Reporter, 3d Series, through 38 F.3d 575.
Federal Supplement, through 864 F. Supp. 174.
Federal Rules Decisions, through 157 F.R.D. 554.
Bankruptcy Reporter, through 173 Bankr. 822.
This volume also contains annotations from decisions of the Utah Supreme
Court and the Utah Court of Appeals filed as of December 15, 1994.
The annotations also include references to the Utah Law Review, the Brigham Young University Law Review, Journal of Contemporary Law, Journal
of Energy, Natural Resources and Environmental Law, American Jurisprudence, Second Series (Am. Jur. 2d), American Law Reports, Third, Fourth,
and Fifth Series (A.L.R.3d, 4th, and 5th) and Federal (A.L.R. Fed.), and Corpus Juris Secundum (C.J.S.). These and other helpful notes and references
have been reviewed, updated, and relocated where necessary. Cross-reference
notes to statutory and judicial material of similar and/or related subject matter located elsewhere in the Code are provided.
Acknowledgment is made to the courts in Utah and their administrative
staffs for providing copies of various rules and their amendments and official
comments.
The Michie Company
March 1995
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Fillmore City v Reeve, 571 P.2d 1316 (Utah
1977).
Separate action.
Subdivision (c) of this rule does not preclude
a separate action on an injunction bond;
rather, it allows an action on the bond to be
enforced in the action in which it is filed at the
option of the enjoined party. Mountain States
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984).
Wrongfully issued injunction.
If the restraining or enjomder is not wrongful, the party enjoined has no basis for recovery
on the bond; if, however, it is found that the
injunction was wrongfully issued, the enjoined
party has an action for costs and damages incurred as a result of the wrongfully issued injunction. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d
1258 (Utah 1984).
The award of attorney fees to be paid from an
injunction bond Bhould be limited only to the
hours spent by defendants' counsel as a result
of the wrongfully issued injunction. Beard v
Dugdale, 741 P.2d 968 (Utah Ct App. 1987).
Showing by party sought to be enjoined.
—Operation of nuisance.
A defendant who wants to operate a plant
which has been declared to be a nuisance is
required to offer evidence to the court as to how
the plant can be used without creating a nuisance before he can complain that the court did
not tell him how he could use his plant. Draper
v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 121 Utah 567, 244
P.2d 360 (1952).

Wrongful injunction.
—Attorney's fees.
When attorney's fees are incurred in defending against wiongfully obtained injunctive relief and also against an underlying lawsuit, it
is appropriate to determine the amount of the
total fees attributable to resist mg the injunc.
tion. Saunders v. Sharp, 793 P.2d 927 (Utah
Ct App. 1990),
Under this rule, a party is entitled to lecover
only those attorney fees that would not have
been incurred but for the application for, and
issuance of, the preliminary irjunction. F e e 8
that would have been incurred anyway, m the
course of proving the party's entitlement to
judgment and refuting the opposing party's defenses, are not recoverable. Tholen v. Sandy
City. 849 P.2d 592 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, d*
nied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993).
—Measure of damages.
The correct measure of damages is the redurtion or diminution in the value of the property
during the period of restraint 3f the value of
the property did not diminish during that period, any measure of damages other than a
comparison of the fair market value of the
property before and after the injunction would
be incorrect. Saunders v. Sharp, 793 P.2d 927
(Utah Ct. App. 1990).
—Noncompliance with rule,
A temporary restraining order that failed to
define the injury and state why it was irreparable, containing instead mere conclusory
statements, and that failed to list the reasons
for extending the order, was improperly
granted. Birch Creek Irrigatior v. Prothero,
858 P.2d 990 (Utah 1993).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 42 Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions
§§ 10, 14, 48 to 52, 69 et seq., 265, 296 to 303,
310 to 316.
C.J.S. — 43 C.J.S. Injunctions §§ 8,16, 22 to
24, 36 et seq; 43A C.J.S. Injunctions §§ 165,
166, 180, 206, 208.
A.L.R. — Infant's employment contract, enforceability of covenant not tu compete in, 17
A.L.R.3d 863.
Appealability of contempt adjudication or
conviction, 33 A.L.R.3d 448
Review other than by appeal or writ of error,
contempt adjudication or conviction as subject
to, 33 A.L.R,3d 589.
Propriety of permanently enjoining one
guilty of unauthorized use of trade secret from
engaging in sale or manufacture of device in
question, 38 A.L.R.3d 572.
Propriety of injunctive relief against diver-

sion of water by municipal corporation or public utility, 42 A.L.R.3d 426.
Preliminary mandatory injunction to prevent, correct, or reduce effects of polluting
practices, 49 A.L R 3d 1239
What constitutes fraud or forgery justifying
refusal to honor, or injunction against honoring, letter of ci edit under UCC § 5-114(1), (2),
25 A.L.R,4th 239.
Recovery of damages resulting from wrongful issuance of injunction as limited to amount
of bond, 30 A.L.R,4th 273.
Right of employee to injunction preventing
employer from exposing employee to tobacco
smoke in workplace, 37 A.L.R.4th 480.
Propriety of federal court injunction against
suit in foreign country, 78 A.L.R. Fed. 83L
Key Numbers. — Injunction *=» 9 et seq
143, 148, 150, 189, 190, 204, 213.

Rule 65B. Extraordinary relief.
(a) Availability of remedy. Where no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy is available, a person may petition the court for extraordinary relief
on any of the grounds set forth in paragraph (b) (involving wrongful imprisonment), paragraph (c) (involving other types of wrongful restraint on personal
liberty), paragraph (d) (involving the wrongful use of public or corporate authority) or paragraph (e) (involving the wrongful use of judicial authority and
the failure to exercise such authority). There shall be no special form of writ.
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The procedures in this rule shall govern proceedings on all petitions for extraordinary relief To the extent that this rule does not provide special procedures, proceedings on petitions for extraordinary relief shall be governed by
the procedures set forth elsewhere in these rules.
(b) Wrongful imprisonment.
(1) Scope. Any person committed by a court to imprisonment in a state
prison, other correctional facility or county jail who asserts that the commitment resulted from a substantial denial of rights may petition the
court for relief under this paragraph. This paragraph (b) shall govern
proceedings based on claims relating to original commitments and commitments for violation of probation or parole. This paragraph (b) shall not
govern proceedings based on claims relating to the terms or conditions of
confinement.
(2) Commencement. Except for challenges to parole violation proceedings, the proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition, together
with a copy thereof, with the clerk of the district court in the county in
which the commitment leading to confinement was issued. The court may
order a change of venue on motion of a party for the convenience of the
parties or witnesses. Petitions challenging parole violation proceedings
shall be commenced by filing a petition together with a copy thereof, with
the clerk of the district court in the county in which the petitioner is
located
(3) Contents of the petition. The petition shall set forth all claims
that the petitioner has in relation to the legality of the commitment.
Additional claims relating to the legality of the commitment may not be
raised in subsequent proceedings except for good cause shown. The petition shall state:
(A) the place where the petitioner is restrained;
(B) the name of the court by which the petitioner was convicted
and sentenced and the dates of proceedings in which the conviction
was entered, together with the courts case number for those proceedings, if known by the petitioner;
(C) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts on the basis of which
the petitioner claims a substantial violation of rights as the result of
the commitment;
(D) whether or not the judgment of conviction or the commitment
for violation of probation or parole has been reviewed on appeal, and,
if so, the number and caption or title of the appellate proceeding and
the results of the review;
(E) whether the legality of the commitment has already been adjudicated in any prior post-conviction or other civil proceeding, and if so
the reasons for the denial of relief in the prior proceeding.
(4) Attachments to the petition. The petitioner shall attach to the
petition affidavits, copies of records or other evidence available to the
petitioner in support of the allegations. The petitioner shall also attach to
the petition a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior
post-conviction or other civil proceeding that adjudicated the legality of
the commitment, and a copy of all orders and memoranda of the court. If
copies of pertinent pleadings, orders, and memoranda are not attached,
the petition shall state why they are not attached.
(5) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth
argument or citations or discuss authorities in the petition, but these may
be set out in a separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed
with the petition.
(6) Assignment by the presiding judge. On the filing of the petition,
the clerk shall promptly deliver it to the assigned judge of the court in
which it is filed. Except for challenges to parole violation proceedings, the
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presiding judge shall if possible assign the proceeding in the judge who
issued the commitment.
(7) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition, if it l8
apparent to the court that the issues presented in the petition have already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if for any other reason
any claim in the petition shall appear frivolous on its face, the court shall
forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating that the claim is
frivolous on its face. The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner.
Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the entry of the order of
dismissal The order of dismissal need not recite findings of fact or conclusions of law.
(8) Service of petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court concludes that all or part of the petition is not frivolous on its face, the court
shall designate the portions of the petition that are not frivolous and
direct the clerk to serve a copy of the petition and a copy of any memorandum by mail upon the attorney general and the county attorney.
(9) Responsive pleading. Within twenty days (plus time allowed under these rules for service by mail) after service of a copy of the petition
upon the attorney general and county attorney, or within such other
period of time as the court may allow, the attorney general or county
attorney shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition
that have not been dismissed and shall serve the answer or other response
upon the petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within twenty days
(plus time allowed for service by mail) after service of any motion to
dismiss or for summary judgment, the petitioner may respond by memorandum to the motion. No further pleadings or amendments will be peimitted unless ordered by the court.
(10) H e a r i n g s . After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set
the proceeding for a hearing or otherwise dispose of the case. Upon motion
for good cause, the court may grant leave to either party to take discovery
or to extend the date for the hearing. Prior to the hearing, the court may
order either the petitioner or the state or county to obtain any relevant
transcript or court records. The court may also order a prehearing conference, but the conference shall not be set so as to delay unreasonably the
hearing on the merits of the petition. The petitioner shall be present
before the court at hearings on dispositive issues but need not otherwise
be present in court during the proceeding
(11) Orders. If the court rules in favor of the petitioner, it shall enter
an appropriate order with respect to the validity of the challenged commitment and with respect to rearraignment, retrial, resentencing, custody, bail or discharge. The court shall enter findings of fact and conclusions of law, as appropriate, following any evidentiary hearing or any
hearing on a dispositive motion. Upon application of the attorney general
or the county attorney, or upon its own motion, the court may stay release
of the petitioner pending appeal of its order.
(12) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as allowed under Rule 54(d), to any party as it deems appropriate. If the
petitioner is unable to pay the costs of the proceeding, the petitioner may
proceed upon an affidavit of impecuniosity, in which event the court may
direct that the costs be paid by the county in which the complainant was
originally charged.
(13) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition
may be appealed to and reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme
Court of Utah in accord with the statutes governing appeals to those
courts.
(c) Other wrongful r e s t r a i n t s on p e r s o n a l liberty.
(1) Scope. Except for instances governed by paragraph (b) of this rule,
this paragraph (c) shall govern all petitions claiming that a person has
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been wrongfully restrained of personal liberty, and the court may grant
relief appropriate under this paragraph.
(2) Commencement. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a
petition with the clerk of the court in the district in which the petitioner
is restiamed or the respondent resides or in which the alleged restraint is
occurring.
(3j Contents of the petition a n d attachments. The petition shall
contain a short, plain statement of the facts on the basis of which the
petitioner seeks relief. It shall identify the respondent and the place
where the person is restrained. It shall state the cause or pretense of the
resiraint, if known by the petitioner. It shall state whether the legality of
the restraint has already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding and, if so,
the reasons for the denial of relief in the prior proceeding. The petitioner
shall attach to the petition any legal process available to the petitioner
that resulted in restraint. The petitioner shall also attach to the petition a
copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior proceeding that
adjudicated the legality of the restraint.
(4) M e m o r a n d u m of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth
argument or citations or discuss authorities in the petition, but these may
be set oat in a separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed
with the petition.
(5) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition, if it is
apparent to the court that the legality of the restraint has already been
adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if for any other reason any claim in
the petition shall appear frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith
issue an order dismissing the claim, stating that the claim is frivolous on
its face and the reasons for this conclusion. The order need not state
findings of fact or conclusions of law. The order shall be sent by mail to
the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the entry of
the order of dismissal.
(6) Responsive pleadings. If the petition is not dismissed as being
frivolous on its face, the court shall direct the clerk of the court to serve a
copy of the petition and a copy of any memorandum upon the respondent
by mail. At the same time, the court may issue an order directing the
respondent to answer or otherwise respond to the petition, specifying a
time within which the respondent must comply. If the circumstances require, the court may also issue an order directing the respondent to appear before the court for a hearing on the legality of the restraint. An
answer to a petition shall state plainly whether the respondent has restrained the person alleged to have been restrained, whether the person
so restrained has been transferred to any other person, and if so, the
identity of the transferee, the date of the transfer, and the reason or
authority for the transfer. Nothing in paragraph (c) shall be construed to
prohibit the court from ruling upon the petition based upon a dispositive
motion.
(7) T e m p o r a r y relief. If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained will be removed from the court's jurisdiction or will suffer irreparable injury before compliance with the hearing order can be enforced, the
court shall issue a warrant directing the sheriff to bring the respondent
before the court to be dealt with according to law. Pending a determination of the petition, the court may place the person alleged to have been
restrained in the custody of such other persons as may be appropriate.
18) Alternative service of the h e a r i n g order. If the respondent cannot be found, or if it appears that a person other than the respondent has
custody of the person alleged to be restrained, the hearing order and any
ocher process issued by the court may be served on the person having
custody in the manner and with the same effect as if that person had been
named as respondent m the action
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(9) Avoidance of service by r e s p o n d e n t If anyone having custody 0f
the person alleged to be restrained avoids service of Lhe hearing order or
attempts wrongfully to remove the person from the court's jurisdiction
the sheriff shall immediately arrest the responsible person. The sheriff
shall forthwith bring Lhp person arrested before the court to be dealt with
according to law,
(10) H e a r i n g or other proceedings. In the event that the court orders a hearing, the court shall hear the matter in a summary fashion and
shall render judgment accordingly. The respondent or other person having custody shall appear with the person alleged to be restrained or shall
state the reasons for failing to do so The court may nevertheless direct
the respondent to bring before it the person alleged to be restrained. If the
petitioner waives the right to be present at the hearing, the court shall
modify the hearing order accordingly. The hearing order shall not be
disobeyed for any defect of form or any misdescription in the order or the
petition, if enough is stated to impait the meaning and intent of the
proceeding to the respondent.
(d) Wrongful use of or failure to exercise public authority.
(1) Who m a y petition the court; security. The attorney general may,
and when directed to do so by the governor shall, petition the court for
relief on the grounds enumerated in this paragraph (d). Any person who
is not required to be represented by the attorney general and who is
aggrieved or threatened by one of the acts enumerated in subparagraph
(2) of this paragraph (d) may petition the court under this paragraph (d) if
(A) the person claims to be entitled to an office unlawfully held by another or (B) if the attorney general fails to file a petition under this
paragraph after receiving notice of the person's claim. A petition filed by
a person other than the attorney general under this paragraph shall be
brought in the name of the petitioner, and the petition shall be accompanied by an undertaking with sufficient sureties to pay any judgment for
costs and damages that may be recovered against ihe petitioner in the
proceeding. The sureties shall be in the form for bonds on appeal provided
for in Rule 70.
(2) G r o u n d s for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where a
person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public
office, whether civil or military, a franchise, or an office in a corporation
created by the authority of the state of Utah; (B) where a public officer
does or permits any act that results m a forfeiture of the office; (C) where
persons act as a corporation in the state of Utah without being legally
incorporated: (D^ where any corporation has violated the laws of the state
of Utah relating to the creation, alteration or renewal of corporations; or
(E) where any corporation has forfeited or misused its corporate rights,
privileges or franchises.
(3) P r o c e e d i n g s on ihe petition. On the filing oF a petition, the court
may require that notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, or may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to
appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may also grant temporary
relief in accordance with the terms of Rule 65A.
(e) Wrongful use of judicial authority or failure to comply with duty.
(1) Who m a y petition, A person aggrieved or whose interests are
threatened by any of the acts enumerated in this paragraph (e) may
petition the court for relief,
(2) G r o u n d s for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where
an inferior court, administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial
functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion; (B) where
an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person has failed
to perform an act required by law as a duty of office, trust or station; or
(C) where an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person
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has refused the petitioner the use or enjoyment of a right or office to
which the petitioner is entitled.
(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, the court
may require that notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, or may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to
appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may direct the inferior
court, administrative agency, officer, corporation or other person named
as respondent to deliver to the court a transcript or other record of the
proceedings. The court may also grant temporary relief in accordance
with the terms of Rule 65A.
(4) Scope of review. Where the challenged proceedings are judicial in
nature, the court's review7 shall not extend further than to determine
whether the respondent has regularly pursued its authority.
(Amended effective September 1, 1991; May 1, 1993.)
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule
represents a complete reorganization of the former rule. This rule also revises parts of the
former rule dealing with habeas corpus and
post-conviction remedies. The rule applies generally to proceedings that are necessitated by
the absence of another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the court. After the rule's introductory paragraph, each subsequent paragraph is intended to deal with a separate type
of proceeding. Thus, subparagraph (b) deals
with proceedings involving wrongful imprisonment, subparagraph (c) deals with proceedings
involving other types of wrongful restraint on
personal liberty; paragraph (d) deals with proceedings involving the wrongful use of public
or corporate authority; and paragraph (e) deals
with proceedings involving the wrongful use of
judicial authority or the failure to exercise
such authority. To the extent that the special
procedures set forth in these paragraphs do not
cover specific procedural issues that arise during a proceeding, the normal rules of civil procedure will apply.
This rule effectively eliminates the concept
of the "writ" from extraordinary relief procedure In the view of the advisory committee,
the concept was used inconsistently and
confusingly in the former rule, and there was
disagreement among judges and lawyers as to
what it meant in actual practice. The concept
has been replaced with terms such as "hearing
order" and "relief that are more descriptive of
the procedural reality
Paragraph (b). This paragraph replaces subparagraph (i) of the former rule. It governs proceedings based on claims of wrongful imprisonment, regardless whether the claim relates to
an original commitment or a commitment for
violation of probation or parole, but this paragraph does not govern proceedings based upon
claims relating to the terms or conditions of
confinement. Claims relating to the terms or
conditions of confinement are governed by subParagraph (c) of the rule. Paragraph (b), as a
general matter, simplifies the pleading retirements in wrongful imprisonment cases
a
^d contains three significant changes from
procedure under the former rule. First, the
Paragraph requires the presiding judge to asS1
gn wrongful imprisonment cases "if possible"
*° l ^ e judge who issued the commitment order.
Second, the rule allows the court to dismiss

frivolous claims before any answer or other responsive pleading is required. This provision is
patterned after the federal practice pursuant to
18 U.S.C § 2254. Third, the attorney general
or county attorney must file a responsive
pleading only after the court has concluded
that all or part of the petition is not frivolous
on its face and has directed the clerk to serve a
copy of the petition The advisory committee
adopted the summary procedures set forth in
paragraph (b) as a means of balancing the requirements of fairness and due process on the
one hand against the public's interest in the
efficient adjudication of the enormous volume
of wrongful imprisonment cases pending in the
courts.
Paragraph (e). This paragraph governs all
petitions claiming that a person has been
wrongfully restrained of personal liberty other
than those specifically governed by paragraph
(b). It replaces paragraph (f) of the former rule.
Like paragraph (b) of the present rule, paragraph (c) endeavors to simplify the procedure
in habeas corpus cases and provides for a
means of summary dismissal of frivolous
claims. Thus, if it is apparent to the court that
the claim is "frivolous on its face", the court
may issue an order dismissing the claim, which
terminates the proceeding. Apart from this significant change from former practice, paragraph (c) is patterned after the former rule.
Paragraphs (d) and (e) replace paragraph (b)
of the former rule. The committee's general
purpose in drafting these paragraphs was to
simplify and clarify the requirements of the
preexisting paragraph.
Paragraph (d). Paragraph (d) replaces paragraph (b)(1) of the former rule. This paragraph
deals generally with proceedings for the unlawful use cf public office or corporate franchises. As a general matter, the attorney general may seek relief on grounds enumerated in
the paragraph. Any other person, including a
governmental officer or entity not required to
be represented by the attorney general, may
also seek relief under paragraph (d) if the person claims to be entitled to an office unlawfully
held by another or if the attorney general fails
to file a petition under paragraph (d) after receiving notice of the person's claim. In allowing
appropriate governmental entities and officers
to proceed under this paragraph, the rule eliminates a procedural barrier that previously pre-
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vented anyone other than the attorney general
and "private" persons to seek relief. Although
the rule removes the procedural barrier, it was
not intended to modify the substantive rules
that hmit the authority or standing of any governments! entity or officer. Nor was the rule
intended to modify the constitutional or statutory authority of the attorney general. Since
paragraph (d) provides only a general outline
of procedures to be used in such proceedings,
litigants should look to the other rules of civil
procedure for guidance on specific questions
not covered by paragraph (d). In proceedings
under this paragraph and paragraph (e), parties seeking temporary relief in advance of a
hearing on the merits should comply with the
requirements of Rule 65A.
Paragraph (e). This paragraph governs relatively unusual proceedings in which the normal rules of appellate procedure are inadequate to provide redress for an abuse by a
court, administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial or administrative functions. This
paragraph replaces subparagraph (2), (3) and
(4) of paragraph (b) of the former rule. Like
para^ajoh (d), this paragraph allows the court
wide discretion in the manner in which such
proceedings are handled. Like the former rule,
the scope of review under this paragraph is
limited to determining whether the respondent
has regularly pursued its authority.
1992 Revisions.
These revisions harmonize parallel provisions of the rule and address technical problems relating to venue and the content of memoranda and orders in habeas corpus and postconviction proceedings.
Paragraph (b). Changes to this paragraph
affect the venue requirements for one category
of extraordinary relief petition. The general
rule established in the paragraph is that petitions governed by paragraph (b) must be commenced in the district court in the county in
which the commitment leading to confinement
was issued. Challenges to parole violation proceedings, however, should be filed in the district court in the county in which the petitioner
is located.
Paragraph (c). The changes to this paragraph enlarge the discretion of the court in
dealing with those petitions for wrongful re-

straint that the paragraph governs. In dismissing claims that are frivolous on their face, the
court is relieved of the responsibility to state
findings of fact or conclusions of law. This
change harmonizes paragraph (c) with the parallel requirements of paragraph (b)(7) of the
rule. Other changes allow the court more discretion in ordering a hearing concerning unlawful restraints. The remaining changes in
this paragraph clarify the contents of pleadings and memoranda filed with the court.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective September 1, 1991, rewrote the
rule to such an extent that a detailed description is impracticable.
The 1993 amendment, effective May 1, 1993,
in Subdivision (b)(2) added the proviso and
substituted "district court in the county" for
"court" in the first sentence, added the last
sentence, and made a stylistic change; in Subdivision (b)(3) substituted the present paragraph designations for "(i)" to "(v)"; in Subdivision (b)(6) substituted "assigned judge" for
"presiding judge" in the first sentence and
added the proviso in the second sentence;
added Subdivision (c)(4) and redesignated the
following subdivisions accordingly; added the
second sentence in Subdivision (c)(5); and reWrote Subdivisions (c)(6) and (10).
Compiler's Notes. — There is no federal
Vule covering the subject matter contained in
this rule, except for Rule 81(a)(2), FJR.C.R,
Which applies the federal rules to proceedings
tor habeas corpus.
The federal statute governing remedies on
^notion attacking sentence appears at 28
IJ.S.C. § 2255.
Rule 73, cited in Subdivision (d), was repealed with the adoption of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure in 1985. For present proVisions regarding bonds on appeal, see U.R.
App. P. 6.
Cross-References. — Corporations, Title
16.
Extraordinary writs, U.R. App. P. 19
Habeas corpus proceedings, U.R. App. P. 20.
Statute of limitations for habeas corpus ac
t;ion, § 78-12-31.1.
Statute of limitations for postconviction relief action, § 78-12-31.2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Extended parole.
—Discretion of board.
Grounds.
—Certiorari.
Civil service commission.
—Challenge to criminal court's jurisdiction.
—Mandamus.

Statutory duty of agency.
-—Prohibition.
Judicial press restrictions.
Ilabeas corpus.
-—Availability.
Conditions of confinement.
Cruel and unusual punishment.
Custody of children.
Denial of procedural due process.

Addendum J

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD DEE THOMAS,

COURT RULING

Petitioner,
vs.
Case Number 950900814
STATE OF UTAH,
FRANCES PALACIOS,
Respondents.

The petition in this matter was filed on February 7, 1995, and the Respondents filed a
Motion to Dismiss the Petition on August 16, 1995. On September 22, 1995, the petitioner
filed a letter dated September 15, 1995. The Court viewed the letter as a Motion for
Disqualification and subsequently referred the case to Judge Timothy R. Hanson as required
by Rule 29 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. In a minute entry filed December 5,
1995, Judge Hanson ruled that "the letter of September 15, 1995, to the extent that it is a
request for Judge Lewis to disqualify herself, is legally insufficient," and he transferred the
case back to this Court. Before the Court had an opportunity to rule on the Respondents'
Motion to Dismiss, the petitioner filed three documents: "Appointment of Master," filed
December 4, 1995; a letter to Judge Hanson, filed December 11, .1995; "Motion for
Evidentiary Hearing," filed December 18, 1995. The Court has reviewed those letters and
believes the documents to be substantively a Motion to Reconsider. For the reasons set forth
below, the petition for extraordinary relief is dismissed. The petitioner's Motion to
Reconsider is also denied.
The Coun has considered the petition for extraordinary relief and the Respondents'
Motion to Dismiss Petition for Extraordinary Relief and Memorandum In Support. The Court

finds that the Petition is premature; the Petitioner has another plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy available through the appellate process; therefore, the petition is frivolous on its face
Rule 65B(a) clearly states that a person may petition the court for extraordinary relie:
where no other plain, speedy and adequate relief is available. In his Petition, the Petitioner
appears to challenge the authority of a Commissioner to issue a search warrant. The Petitio
was filed in this court before the Petitioner's trial and sentence on the matter in question.
The Court finds that the Petition is untimely and inappropriate. The Petitioner has an
adequate remedy of direct appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals or the Utah Supreme Court.
The petition is dismissed. The Petitioner's Motion to Reconsider is denied. The
Respondent shall prepare an Order of Dismissal consistent with the Court's Ruling.

Dated this

day of December, 1995.

LESLIE A. LEWIS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

RLED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

M

9 W6

ANGELA F. MICKLOS (6229)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Utah Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondents
124 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1021

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD DEE THOMAS,
Petitioner,

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

Case No. 950900814
STATE OT UTAH,
FRANCES PALACIOS,

Judge Leslie A. Lewis

Respondents.

The above-captioned matter came before the Court for consideration of
respondents' motion to dismiss the petition for extraordinary relief and petitioner's motion
to reconsider.

Respondents filed the motion to dismiss on August 16, 1995.

On

September 22, 1995, petitioner filed a letter which the Court viewed as a motion for
disqualification. The Court referred the matter to the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson for
review. Judge Hanson ruled that petitioner's letter was legally insufficient to require

disqualification. Before the Court had an opportunity to rule on respondents' motion tc
dismiss, petitioner filed three documents, which the Court considered collectively as i
motion to reconsider. After reviewing the entire file in this matter, the Court now enters the
following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

By information dated July 6, 1993, petitioner was charged witl

aggravated robbery, a first degree felony.
2.

On January 31,1995, petitioner filed a petition for extraordinary relie

claiming that Commissioner Frances Paiacios lacked authority to issue the search warrar
in circuit case number 931008943 (district court case number 931901914).
3.

After a jury trial on August 3-4, 1995, petitioner was convicted z

4.

At the time he filed his petition, petitioner had not yet been convict*

charged.

or sentenced.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Extraordinary relief pursuant to rule 65B, Utah Rules of C

Procedure, is appropriate only when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate re
available.

2

2.

The petition is premature because petitioner has an adequate remedy

of a direct appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals or the Utah Supreme Court.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1.

Respondents' motion to dismiss is granted.

2.

The relief requested in the petition is denied and the petition is

dismissed with prejudice.
3.

Petitioner's motion to reconsider is denied.

/ft*
DATED this y

~ a i v of January, 1 9 9 £ ^ \
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July 16,1997

Craig Ludwig
Clerk of the Court
Division I
240 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Re:

Richard P. Thomas v. State of Utah
Supreme Court Number 970284

Dear Mr* Ludwig:
Richard D. Thomasfiledin the Supreme Court a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and
a Motion to Consolidate Writ of Habeas Corpus with his Petition for Writ of Certiorari
The Supreme Court is remanding the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus back to the
district court for disposition. The Court has denied the motion to consolidate.
Enclosed is a copy of Mr. Thomas's petition for writ of habeas corpus along with the
Court's remand order. If you have any questions, please call me at 538-1044.
Sincerely,

(. /^WL^o
Susan E. Richards
Lead Deputy Court Clerk
Enc.
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Michael O. Leavitt
(lovrrnor
Raylcne (i. Ireland
Kxccutive Dirni'tnr
.Jeffcry O. Johnson
•Jivisitm i J i n r i c r

Department of Administrative Services
Division of Archives & Records Services
State CaDitoi Archives Building
Salt Lane City. Utah 84114-1021
Te1 '80D 528-3012
^ / -SOli 525 2254

October 23. 1995

Richard D. Thomas
Inmate #13260
Housing Unit SMU Dogwood F-2
Central Utah Correctional Facility
POB 550
Gunnison UT 84634
Dear Mr. Thomas:
This is with regard to your recent request for the following:
"Salt Lake County—City, annexation to Utah Board of Pardons, as a court
in city municipality. Specifically the Governor's proclamation of voters
annexing city, county, to Board of Pardons, by 17-2-4, to include the
Certification of election results of governor, 17-2-3."
Please be advised that the Board of Pardons is not "annexed" to the city or the county.
The Utah Code sections you cite are concerned with annexing county to county. Further, the
Utah Board of Pardons is not a court in any city municipality.

lathieen Pardee
Reference Archivist

Addendum M

PAULW.BOYDEN
•VKTTORIAJ PMAOOS
GARY L WEBSTER

* A U L W SHEFFIELD
Admtofetrttor

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PAROUS AGREEMENT
I, Richard D. Thomas, agree to be directed and supervised by Agents of the Utah State
Department of Corrections and be accountable for my actions and conduct to Utah State
Corrections, according to this Agreement.
I further agree to abide by all conditions of parole as set forth in this Agreement and any
additional conditions as set forth by the Utah State Board of Pardons, consistent with the
laws of the State of Utah, I fully understand that the violation of this Agreement and/or any
conditions thereof or any new conviction for a criiae may result in action by the Board causing
my parole to be revoked or my parole period to start over,
CONDITIONS OF PARCU:
On the day of my release from the institution or confinement. I will
RELEASE:
report to my assigned Parole Agent, unless otherwise approved in writing.
I shall establish a residence of recorxJ and shall reside at such residence
RESIDENCE:
in fact and on record and shall not change my place of residence without
knowledge of my Parole Agent: and I shall not leave the State of Utah
without prior written mithorization from my Parole Agent. It is hereby
acknowledged that should I leave the State of Utah without written
authorization from my Parole Agent that I hereby waive extradition, from any
state in irtiich I may be found, to the State of Utah.
I
shall obey all State and Federal laws and municipal ordinances at all
3. CONDUCT:
times.
I shall make written or in person reports to my Parole Agent by the fifth
4. REPORT:
o ~ each and every month or as directed and I shall permit visits to my place
o residence, as required#by my Parole Agent for the purpose of insurirc
pliance with the conditions of parole.
comp
I will seek and maintain full-time employment unless I am participating in
5 . IMPIXHMENT:
an educational or therapy program approved by my Parole Agent.
I agree to allow a Parole Agent to search my person, residence, vehicle,
6 . SEARCH:
or any other
**ier property under my control, without a warrant*
" any time
^* day
" or
night,
by a Parole Agent, to insure
,**6»«r, upon
**yon reasonable suspicion^.as ascertained
ascen
coopliance
:oopliance with the conditions of my parole.
parol
I shall not own, possess, or have under my control or in my custody any
WEAPONS:
explosives, firearms, or any dangerous weapons as defined in Utah Code
Annotated, Section 76-10-501, as amended.
8. ASSOCIATION: I shall not associate with any known criminal in any manner which can
reasonably te expected to result in, or which has resulted in criminal or
9.

SPECIAL CONDITIONS: I shall:
1. Submit to Random Urinalysis.
2. Successfully cocplete ISP program.
3. Successfully complete Substance Abuse Therapy.

I have read, understand and agree to the above conditions and I hereby acknowledge receipt of
a copy of this Agreement.
WITNESSED BY:
TITLE:

this

day of

, 19

SIGNED:
Parolee
ADDRESS:

Administrator, Board of Pardons
AMENDED 7/26/1988

MEMBERS
DENNIS M. FUCHS
VICTORIA J. RALACIOS
GARY L. WEBSTER
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PAUL W.SHEFFIELD
Administrator

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ORDER OF PAROLE
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF RICHARD D. THOM\S
UTAH STATE PRISON NO. l5?5ff
This matter of application for parole, termination of sentence, or expiration of sentence
ving come before the Utah State Board of Pardons in a regularly scheduled hearing on the
th day of April, 1987, and the applicant appearing in person or having waived in writing the
ght to appearance and the Board having heard the case, issues the following order:
It is hereby ordered that Richard D. Thomas be paroled from the punishment and sentence
retofore imposed upon him/her by a judge of the Second and Third Judicial District Court in
d for the County of Davis and Salt Lake for the crime(s) of Aggravated Robbery* 1st degree,
piration Life top; Aggravated Kidnapping, 1st degree to run Consecutive, Expiration life
p; Attempted Escape, 3rd degree to Run Consecutive.
The parole shall not become effective until the 14th day of October, 1986. The applicant
rees to the conditions of parole and evidences his agreement by signing the parole
reement.

The parole agreement or contract shall be administered by duly authorized agents

the Utah State Department of Corrections for the Utah State Board of Pardons.
It is further ordered that if and in the event the above named applicant shall be guilty
any infractions of the rules and regulations of the Utah State Prison or shall fail or
fuse to perform duties as assigned by the Utah State Prison or is found to be in violation
any other law of the State of Utah prior to the effective date of said parole, then this
der of Parole is revoked and becomes null and void.
Dated this 27th day of April, 1987.
By Order of the Board of Pardons of the State of Utah, I have this 27th day of April,
87, reduced its decision in this matter to writing and hereby affix my signature as
irainistrator for and on behalf of the State of Utah, Board of Pardons.

PAUL W. SHEFFIELD

Administrator

